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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical framework of endogenous network
formation that yields testable predictions for the network architec-
tures generated by a particular informal institution common in village
economies. We test the implications of the model on data from rural
Ethiopia. In contrast to the current literature, we demonstrate the
critical role of both number of links and architecture in determining
the impact of social networks on outcomes. Social capital matters,
but its impact di¤ers by the architecture of the network to which one
belongs.
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1 Introduction
There is a vast empirical literature aiming to establish a link between social
networks and economic performance (for a recent review, see [3]). In parallel,
there is a burgeoning theoretical literature which aims to model the endoge-
nous formation of social networks (for a recent review, see [27]). While
these two literatures are slowly becoming aware of each other, there is still
little empirical work that uses the equilibrium predictions of a theoretical
model of network formation to assess the impact of networks on outcomes.
In particular, while the main focus of the theoretical literature has been to
characterise the structure or architecture of equilibrium social networks, the
empirical work has typically used only the number of links interconnecting
agents to represent networks1. For example, this is the approach taken in
Putnam [37] and by Glaeser et al. [22]
In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework that o¤ers testable
predictions for the network architectures generated by a particular infor-
mal institution common in village economies. In contrast to the current
literature, we demonstrate the critical role of both number of links and ar-
chitecture in determining the impact of social networks on outcomes.
Since two seminal articles by Jackson and Wolinsky [28] and Bala and
Goyal [1], a lively strand of literature has developed, o¤ering a theory of
strategic network formation. According to this literature individuals ratio-
nally choose whether to form or delete links with other agents. The focus
has been to identify the network structures that emerge in equilibrium un-
der di¤erent assumptions about the process of network formation and on
the nature of the network externalities in place, whether positive or nega-
tive. In this paper, we build on this theoretical literature to capture the
essential features of an informal labour-sharing network and allow for het-
erogeneity amongst agents. This provides us with a framework that can be
readily adapted for use in empirical analysis. We carry the predictions of our
model to data from a household survey conducted in 1994 in rural Ethiopia.
We have detailed information on 1477 households in 15 villages in di¤erent
regions of the country. The data o¤er information on various aspects of
household structure, incomes, consumption, assets, investment and partici-
pation in local informal networks. We use the data to test the consistency
of the empirical evidence with the theoretical equilibrium characterisations,
and illustrate the implications of the theoretical framework for inference on
the impact of networks on economic performance.
Our focus on network formation is driven by the observation that im-
portant market and non-market transactions take place within social net-
works in these villages. These include informal insurance groups (largely fu-
1 It should be acknowledged that the sociological literature on networks has been far
richer in this respect and network characteristics beyond the number of links have been
taken into account ([23], [31]).
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neral societies, the iddir), rotating savings and credit associations (equbs),
as well as various kinds of oxen-sharing, crop sharing and labour sharing
arrangements. Among this plethora of informal institutions, labour sharing
arrangements stand out for they are both ubiquitous and vary in the fash-
ion in which members are connected to each other. In contrast, both iddirs
and equbs operate as tightly-knit groups where every agent is directly linked
to every other while oxen-sharing and crop-sharing arrangements typically
involve pairs of farmers so that there is no variation in architectures in such
arrangements. Labour sharing networks in these villages are classied in
di¤erent ways in the local languages but two main types of labour sharing
arrangements seem to dominate. We discuss this variation in type in detail
in what follows: however, the fact that otherwise similar work parties are
known under di¤erent local names according to the network architecture
of the labour-sharing arrangements provides support to our view that the
structure of the social network and not just its size matters when it comes
to identifying informal institutions.
In this paper, we thus focus on labour sharing networks. We build a sim-
ple model of labour-sharing arrangements where farmers can decide whether
and with whom to labour-share. Farmers di¤er in their quality or other
productivity enhancing endowments. A better endowed farmer is a more
appealing partner; however better endowed farmers have lower incentives
to labour-share. As ubiqitous in the game-theoretic literature on endoge-
nous network formation, the village economy that we model admits multiple
equilibria: di¤erent social networks might emerge among the same farmers
in the same village, under the same conditions. However, while this has the
important implication that it is impossible to uniquely predict the social net-
work that will form on the basis of the initial distribution of endowments,
we nevertheless identify equilibrium characterisations that are shared by
any stable network architecture. In particular we show that in any endoge-
nous network symmetric labour-sharing arrangements (i.e. labour-sharing
arrangements between farmers who have the same number of partners) are
stable only among farmers who are of similar quality. On the contrary,
asymmetric labour sharing arrangements (i.e. such that the farmers in-
volved have a di¤erent number of partners) are stable only among farmers
who di¤er greatly in quality and endowments, with the better farmer hav-
ing more links than his less endowed neighbour. Multiplicity of equilibria
prevents a simple direct test of our network formation model: any initial dis-
tribution of endowments could lead to multiple equilibrium congurations.
We can nevertheless take the features of our equilibrium characterisation to
the data and on doing so nd that the observed social network structures
in rural Ethiopia conform to the properties that our model predicts. In
accordance with our theoretical characterisation, we nd empirically that
symmetric networks are more likely to emerge among households who do
not di¤er in quality; heterogeneity in quality, on the other hand, is more
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likely to be observed among participants in asymmetric network structures.
These results have important consequences for the impact of networks
on economic performance. In our data, we illustrate this by focusing on
agricultural output and the impact of labour-sharing networks. The theo-
retical framework in this paper emphasises the key role of architecture in
the characteristisation of equilibrium networks. Consequently we take the
view that correcting for the endogeneity of networks cannot be based solely
on instrumenting for the number of connections, but must also account for
the network architecture in order to obtain accurate estimates of the impact
of networks on outcomes.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we summarise the
existing literature. In section 3, we present a simple endogenous network
formation model to explain the emergence of particular architectures for
labour-sharing groups. Section 4 describes the data. Sections 5 provides
an empirical test of the equilibrium characterisation while Section 6 exam-
ines the implications of endogenous links and architecture for performance.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
2.1 The Theory of Endogenous Network Formation
Bala and Goyal [1] and Jackson and Wolinsky [28] consider a model of in-
formation transmission where network externalities are positive: individual
payo¤s are increasing in the number of agents accessed through the network,
both directly and indirectly. If only the direct links are costly to the agents
and if information transmission is frictionless, so that reported information
is as good as information received rst hand, the only stable network archi-
tecture which is not empty is the star network2: a very asymmetric network
structure where there is a central individual to whom all other agents in the
population are linked. Hence the whole population is connected (there is
a path linking any pair of individuals) and it is also minimally connected
(there is only one such path, through the central agent). No individual is
isolated.
Not surprisingly the results for negative network externalities are quite
di¤erent. Jackson and Wolinsky [28] look at a model where the payo¤ to
each agent in a given network is increasing in the number of direct links
but decreasing in the number of indirect links. In such a setup, the stable
network architecture is very symmetric. The equilibrium network has several
fully interconnected components where all agents have the same number of
links.
2Clearly when the cost of link formation is su¢ ciently high, the only stable congura-
tion is the empty network.
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The fact that from the very complex problem of endogenous network for-
mation, extremely simple network architectures emerge as stable is certainly
intriguing. However it does rest on some heroic assumptions.
A factor which plays a big role in these results is that all agents in
the population are assumed to be identical and to face the same incentives
towards link formation. The few results on network formation with hetero-
geneous agents are very promising in that they point at directions which
are also di¤erent from a qualitative point of view. Hence the homogeneity
assumption does not just simplify the analysis but has a much more crucial
role.
In some recent work, Galeotti and Goyal [20] prove that the set of net-
work architectures that result as the equilibrium outcome of an endogenous
network formation game with heterogeneous agents is extremely large. The
requirements that Nash equilibrium alone imposes on the structure of the
network are minimal: almost any network structure can result as a Nash
equilibrium outcome, for an appropriate set of costs and benets of forming
links.
It would seem that the greatest challenge that the treatment of hetero-
geneity poses is that some structure is needed in the way in which the incen-
tives to form links are modelled. Ideally one would like to have a framework
where both the network formation process and the incentives that underlie
its formation are endogenised.
Johnson and Gilles [29] make a rst step in this direction by endogenising
the cost of forming a link within spatial social networks. They consider a
population of agents who are located on a geographical space, which could
also be interpreted as a space of characteristics. They assume that the cost
of forming a link between any two agents depends on their distance within
this space. They nd conditions such that the simple network architecture
given by the chain is stable. The chain is clearly a network architecture
that is drastically di¤erent from the star, obtained under the assumption of
homogeneous costs within the population.
Haller and Sarangi [26] provide results that seem to challenge the claim
that, when network externalities are positive, the equilibrium network is
connected, so that there is a path between any two agents in the popula-
tion and no individual is isolated. They consider a network where there is
heterogeneity in the (exogenous) probability that each link may fail. What
they nd is that the result in Bala and Goyal [2] that Nash networks are
either connected or empty is only true when the probabilities of failure or
success of di¤erent links are not very di¤erent from each other. Otherwise
partial connectedness may occur in equilibrium. As Galeotti and Goyal [20],
Haller and Sarangi [26] fail to provide more accurate predictions on what
the stable network architecture might look like under heterogeneity. More
structure is needed on the way in which the heterogeneity itself is modelled.
The lesson that can be drawn from this recent theoretical literature on
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endogenous network formation is that simple stability requirements are ex-
tremely successful in pinning down specic network architectures under the
assumption of homogenous agents. As soon as we depart from this assump-
tion and introduce the possibility that di¤erent agents might face di¤erent
incentives of forming and/or deleting links, predictive power is lost and
much more structure is needed on the heterogeneity of the incentives that
we believe to be in place. This implies that while it is might not be feasi-
ble to produce a general and all-encompassing theory of network formation
with heterogeneous individuals that has any predictive power, it ought to
be possible to provide models of endogenous network formation where the
incentive structure is tted to the particular application at hand.
With this qualication in mind, we focus on a theory of endogenous net-
work formation in labour-sharing, building on the observed characteristics
of institutions of labour exchange in rural Ethiopia.
2.2 Empirical Literature
The evidence suggests that many individual outcomes from school atten-
dance to adoption of new technologies are correlated with the behaviour of
the social group or neighbourhood to which the individual agent belongs.
In the context of rural economies, the focus thus far has been on learning
about technologies and on informal insurance. The few papers on this topic
(Foster and Rosenzweig [19], Conley and Udry [9], Bandiera and Rasul [4],
Fafchamps and Lund [16], De Weerdt and Dercon [13]) all nd that social
e¤ects matter. Measuring social e¤ects is problematic for two main rea-
sons. First, the network needs to be identied. Second, even if the network
is correctly identied, distinguishing endogenous social e¤ects from other
correlated phenomena is very hard to do (Manski [30], Brock [7]). Network
members may just behave in similar ways, not because they a¤ect each other
but because, for instance, they live in similar environments and use identical
technologies.
The empirical literature on networks has largely taken the network as ex-
ogenous. In work on developing countries, often villages are taken as the unit
of study (Townsend [38]) and where they are not, exogenous characteristics
such as ethnicity or caste are thought to structure the network (Fafchamps
and Lund [16], Grimard [24] , Munshi and Rosenzweig [33], Luke and Mun-
shi [34]). But even if channels of communications are inherited, the decision
of whether to maintain them (and at what level of activity) does remain.
Foster and Rosenzweig use village-level averages to proxy the information
set, while Bandiera and Rasul have information on the number (but not the
identities) of people who might be part of the network. Conley and Udry [9]
do better, for they have information on the actual identities of individuals
who might represent the social network for information ows. De Weerdt
and Dercon [13] examine networks formed to o¤er informal insurance: again,
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they use information on all the individuals that can be relied upon to pro-
vide transfers. However, none of these papers seeks to model the formation
of networks nor do they use any information on the structure of the network:
for instance, are all individuals in the social group connected to every other
or are they linked in some other fashion? Conley and Udry [9] acknowledge
that The next step in this research programme is to model the choices of
farmers regarding the formation of information links in these villages [.....]
but we know of no empirical work in economics that examines the formation
of decentralised networks.
In some recent work Udry and Conley [39] address this point, by o¤ering
evidence on the determinants of link formation among farmers in Ghana.
They map information, nancial, labour and land networks and estimate
the probability of link formation between any two farmers as a function of
own and partners characteristics. In particular they nd that network in-
teractions are more likely between farmers that are located near each other,
that are in the same matrilineage. Information links are more likely amongst
those who are di¤erent in wealth and who share the same soil characteristics.
De Weerdt [12] presents a similar empirical analysis for Tanzania, investi-
gating the probability of links for informal insurance based on a full village
census. He nds that kinship, geographical proximity, clan membership, re-
ligion and wealth all determine participation in networks and in particular,
the poor have fewer informal insurance links than the rich. He does not
investigate why this is so or indeed its e¤ect on outcomes.
Udry and Conley [39] discuss an equilibrium model of network formation,
where each agents decision to link up also depends on his expectations on
what everyone else will do, and argue that estimation of such a model would
be problematic because of multiplicity of equilibria. This is an obvious dif-
culty that any empirical work on network formation must face and this
paper is no exception. We therefore take an alternative approach: rather
than testing equilibrium predictions, we identify equilibrium characterisa-
tions, i.e. properties that all possible equilibria in our model must share,
and we test whether the data conform to these properties.
3 A Theory of Labour-Sharing Arrangements
The Ethiopian economy is dominated by agriculture which contributes about
45% of GDP and employs 80% of the labour force. The rural economy
has long been subject to strict controls which have strongly a¤ected the
structure of the agricultural labour market. The 1975 land reform declared
illegal all private ownership of land, as well as transfers of land by lease, sale
or mortgage. Since then all land is state owned and allocated to farmers by
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the local Peasants Association (PA)3. The 1975 land reform also prohibited
tenancy and wage labour, although the legal code allowed female-headed
households with dependents, landholders who were ill and soldiers and their
dependents to hire labour or lease out their land.
In 1990 the government started a program of economic reforms: land
tenancy and wage labour (but not land sales) were made legal4. In the last
twenty years markets for agricultural labour have gradually emerged, but
in most villages hired labour is still very uncommon. Wage-labourers are
often villagers who have lost their entitlement to land and for this reason
there is a clear social stigma attached to them5. Supply of hired labour
is extremely thin. Households draw most of the labour they require from
household members. However the seasonal nature of some of the activities
makes household labour periodically insu¢ cient6. Labour shortage particu-
larly occurs during the harvesting, ploughing and weeding seasons. To meet
the high labour demand during di¤erent agricultural operations, people de-
pend heavily on labour-sharing arrangements. In the sample used here, only
4% of the labour used per hectare is hired against cash or other payments
in kind. More than half of the households reported having used labour in
the form of a labour-sharing arrangement and about a fth of the total days
worked were supplied in this way.
Labour-sharing arrangements involve a group of people working together
for a particular task, typically but not exclusively for agricultural activities,
such as harvesting and weeding. The tasks involved are those requiring many
hands, beneting from team labour. The exchange of labour is symmetric
in terms of duration and task - a household that is invited to help weed a
eld for a day, expects to be reciprocated for the same task, for a similar
length of time. Bevan and Pankhurst [6] emphasise that farmers value labour
exchanges for the synergy generated in working with each other. In all
cases, calling a work party implies willingness to reciprocate, either virtually
immediately or in the future. Enforcement is obtained through repeated
interaction: work party participants are usually from the same village and
involve both relatives and friends (on average, 24% of parties involve at
3The rights to transfer land remained highly restricted and despite some attempts
at liberalisation, remain so. Transfer through lease, sale, exchange or mortgage was com-
pletely prohibhited and inheritance allowed only to immediate family members, with some
risk of re-distribution upon inheritance. The use of land is still contingent upon physical
residence making even temporary migration di¢ cult.
4One year later, the Derg government was forcibly removed when EPRDF-forces won
the civil war. The new government has conrmed lease rights in land and wage labour to
be legal.
5Reasons for losing ones entitlement to land include own land neglect and tax evasion.
6The production technology in most highland areas is an ox-plough, with the main crops
being te¤ (a grain particular to highland Ethiopia), barley and maize. Modern inputs,
particularly the use of fertilisers have expanded since 1996; however, for the period under
study, the use of inputs beyond land, labour and oxen was minimal.
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least one relative). Social sanctions are also quite harsh: farmers who have
called a work party but have then failed to reciprocate are socially ostracized
with all their family and nobody would enter labour-exchange arrangements
with them in the future. There is a large variety of specic labour-sharing
arrangements in Ethiopia. While they all share these common elements,
there are some clear di¤erences between the observed work parties. For
example, in Amhara7 regions, a wonfel is often used to describe a work
party performed by a group who work in rotation for each group member,
within the same season. Rotation is strict. A debo involves a work party
whereby it is expected that the household calling the party will reciprocate
if called upon by any of the participants some time in the future. In a debo,
the household organising the work party provides drink (and/or food) for
the day but this does not occur in a wonfel.
In practice, the main di¤erence between a wonfel and a debo seems to lie
in the architecture of the labour-sharing arrangement. Our data suggest that
reciprocation of labour largely took place within the same season, whether
the household participated in a debo or a wonfel. Wonfels are tightly-knit
groups, similar in their structure to equbs (rotating savings and credit asso-
ciations), where every participant is symmetrically linked to everyone else
in the group. Each member of a wonfel relies on the same set of house-
holds for labour-sharing. The network of labour-sharing arrangements that
results from this is dense and heavily clustered. Debos, on the other hand,
have a more sparse and unclustered structure, where each of the participants
to the work party typically relies on a di¤erent set of households. A clear
implication of this is that while wonfels have a symmetric structure where
all the members of the work party have the same number of links, debos
typically take asymmetric structures, where some members have more links
than others.
The fact that otherwise similar work parties are known under di¤er-
ent local names according to the network architecture of the labour-sharing
arrangements provides support to our view that the structure of the social
network and not just its size matters when it comes to identifying informal
institutions. Moreover this observation suggests that for labour-sharing rel-
evant aspects of the network architecture are the symmetry or asymmetry
of the relationship and the level of clustering of the local set of ties.
Finally it is worth emphasising that, irrespective of the network archi-
tecture that emerges from the union of ties, labour-sharing arrangements
are bilateral agreements. The pattern of labour-sharing arrangements ob-
served in these villages mirrors those remarked on elsewhere, particularly
7The Amhara have traditionally been the politically and culturally dominant ethnic
group of Ethiopia. They are located primarily in the central highland plateau of Ethiopia
and comprise the major population element in the provinces of Begemder and Gojjam
and in parts of Shoa and Wallo. In terms of the total Ethiopian population, however, the
Amhara are a numerical minority.
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Africa and Asia. A large number of accounts of such arrangements (called
cooperative labour or exchange labour in the anthropological literature) are
explored by Erasmus [15] and summarised by Moore [32]. They suggest
that exchange labour arrangements are bilateral in the main: reciprocal
arrangements may be made amongst individuals: A and B may work six
days for C; C in return works six days for each of them, but A and B do
not work for one another at all. Note that this does not exclude the possi-
bility that C has bilateral arrangements in place with each of A and B but
the important point is that the reciprocity is to the individual and not to
the group. This is emphasised by the pattern observed in these Ethiopian
villages where the custom is for each participant to the work party to be
invited individually. Moore [32] highlights several di¤erent economic advan-
tages o¤ered by labour exchange arrangements in rural areas of developing
countries, covering most of the reasons o¤ered here including the lack of
hired labour market (perhaps precipitated by the lack of landless labour),
unpredictable requirements for larger labour parties, economies of scale and
higher motivation in working at tedious tasks.
For the purpose of this study we consider a very stylised model for the
formation of labour-sharing arrangements. In particular we build on a model
by Jackson and Wolinsky [28] which we modify by introducing heterogeneity.
Consider a set N of n  3 farmers, indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; n and a set
G of (potential) labour-sharing arrangements gij 2 0; 1, where gij = gji = 1
represents that i and j have a labour-sharing arrangement and gij = gji = 0
represents that i and j do not labour-share. Given that labour-sharing
arrangements are reciprocal we assume that 8ij; gij = gji. The resulting
(undirected) graph g = fgijgi;j2N represents the network of labour-sharing
arrangements.
Individual harvest of farmer i is a function of own e¤ort, e¤ort of all
the other participants in the labour party and a synergy component that
represents the fact that more can be achieved by working together than indi-
vidually. Assume now that farmers di¤er in quality and denote by qi  1;8i
some index of the quality of farmer i. Denote by ni the number of partners
that farmer i has and assume that each farmers allocates his quality adjusted
time (or e¤ort) equally across himself and all partners, so that the amount
of e¤ort that farmer i exerts on his own eld and in each collaboration is
equal to qi=(ni + 1):
The payo¤ (the harvest) of farmer i, given his position in the network g,
is assumed to be equal to:
hi (g) =
qi
1 + ni
+
X
j:ij2g

qj
1 + nj
+
qiqj
(1 + ni) (1 + nj)

(1)
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where
qi
1 + ni
+
X
j:ij2g

qj
1 + nj

is total e¤ort exerted by farmer i and his work party; and the termX
j:ij2g
qiqj
(1 + ni) (1 + nj)
=
qi
1 + ni
X
j:ij2g
qj
1 + nj
is the synergy component: more is achieved by working together than alone.
The presence of such synergy implies that entering a labour-sharing arrange-
ment, although costly to the farmer (it reduces own e¤ort) may nevertheless
be strictly protable. As in [28], a feature of this model is that there is an
implicit cost of link formation in that, through the synergy component, any
additional link dilutes the synergy with all existing partners.8
Farmers maximise total harvest and can rationally form new links or
sever existing ones to this aim. Links can be deleted unilaterally but for
a link to be formed both farmers involved have to agree. This element
of mutual consent implies that it is di¢ cult to try to use any o¤-the-shelf
noncooperative game theoretic solution concepts. In whatever game one
species for link formation, requiring the consent of two players to form a link
means that either some sort of coalitional equilibrium concept is required,
or the game needs to be an extensive form with a protocol for proposing
and accepting links in some sequence. Another serious challenge to the
o¤-the-shelf noncooperative game theoretic approach is that the game is
necessarily ad hoc and ne details of the protocol (e.g., the ordering of who
proposes links when, whether or not the game has a nite horizon, players
are impatient, etc.) generally matter. [...] A di¤erent approach to modeling
network formation is to dispense with the specics of a noncooperative game
and to simply model a notion of what a stable network is directly(Jackson,
[27], p. 21). This is the approach we take as well, in line with the argument
cited above.
Jackson and Wolinsky [28] characterise stable networks, by introducing
the notion of pairwise stability. A pairwise stable network is such that
no agent has an incentive to exit from existing collaborations and no pair
of agents have any incentive to form a new link. This notion of stability
allows that agents review their relationships with network members, one
at a time9. Given the long-standing and bilateral nature of labour-sharing
arrangements, we believe this to be the appropriate stability concept here.
8One might compare this to someone who hosts a large party, where each of the friends
invited contributes to the fun, but when the number of invited friends increases, the quality
of the interaction with each of them decreases. Reduced ability to monitor might have a
similar impact in labour-sharing arrangements for agriculture.
9For example, a pairwise stable network is not necessarily robust to deviations that
involve an agent deleting his links to more than one partner at a time; or deleting a link
with one partner and simultaneously initating a new link with another.
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More formally we state the following:
Denition 1 (Pairwise stable network) A network g is pairwise stable
if
1. 8ij 2 g ) hi (g)  hi (g   ij) and hj (g)  hj (g   ij)
2. 8ij =2 g, if hi (g) < hi (g + ij) ) hj (g) > hj (g + ij)
where g   ij is the shorthand for the network that is obtained by deleting
the link between i and j in network g; g+ij is the shorthand for the network
that is obtained by adding the link between i and j in network g. Moreover
we use the notation ij 2 g to represent the fact that gij = gji = 1, so that i
and j are directly linked in the network g; the notation ij =2 g to represent
the fact that gij = gji = 0.
In this setup, farmers of di¤erent quality will face di¤erent incentives to
link formation. Farmers who are of higher quality (or better endowed) are
more appealing partners. Farmer i will be more willing to link to farmer j
when qj is high: labour-sharing partners of better quality contribute more
to the harvest. However, higher quality farmers are less willing to form new
links: the increase in the number of links has a larger negative marginal
impact on the harvest of a better farmer. Finally, farmers whose existing
partners are of better quality have lower incentives to form new links for
a very similar reason: through the synergy component of their payo¤s, the
increase in the number of their own links has a negative marginal impact on
the level of harvest and this is largest when the pool of current partners is
better endowed.
We can prove the statements above as follows. Consider ij =2 g: farmer
i will (strictly) want to form a link to farmer j if:
hi (g + ij) > hi (g)
where hi (g) in (1) can also be rewritten as:
hi (g) =
qi
1 + ni
+

1 +
qi
1 + ni
 X
k:ik2g
qk
1 + nk
hi (g + ij) =
qi
2 + ni
+

1 +
qi
2 + ni
2664 X
k:ik2g
k 6=j
qk
1 + nk
+
qj
2 + nj
3775
One can easily check that hi (g + ij) > hi (g) i¤
qj
nj + 2
>
qi
1 + ni
 1
ni + 2 + qi
26641 + X
k:ik2g
k 6=j
qk
1 + nk
3775 (2)
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We can interpret the left hand side and the right hand side of (2) respectively
as the marginal benet and cost that i faces when linking to j. The marginal
benet represents the fact that j contributes his e¤ort to the harvest of i:
this is increasing in js quality (qj) and decreasing in the number of links of j
(nj). The marginal cost represents the fact that both directly, through costly
reciprocation, and indirectly, through the synergy component, the increase
in the total number of links of i has a negative impact on farmer is harvest:
this marginal cost is increasing in the quality of the existing partners of i
(i.e. it is increasing in qk); moreover the marginal cost of linking to j is also
increasing in qi. In fact di¤erentiating the rhs of (2) with respect to qi one
obtains:
ni + 2
(1 + ni)
2 (ni + 2 + qi)
2
26641 + X
k:ik2g
k 6=j
qk
1 + nk
3775 > 0
In this setup links have to be mutually agreed, i.e. for a link to be formed
between i and j we will require both i and j to be willing to make that link.
Hence we can ask how the sorting takes place: will strong farmers always
link up with strong, and the weak with weak, or is it the case that poor
(in terms of quality) and better farmers will want to link? The answers to
these questions crucially depend on the equilibrium network architecture. In
particular whether or not two farmers are willing to form a labour-sharing
arrangement will depend not only on the quality of the two potential part-
ners, but also on the number of links that each of them already has in place,
and on the average quality of the existing neighbourhoods of each of them.
It would seem, then, that any question on how the strong and weak farmers
sort cannot be answered without rst characterising the equilibrium network
architecture.
In order to be able to state our results formally, we need some denitions.
First, the notion of a (network) component:
Denition 2 (Component) Given a network g a component C(g)  N is
a set such that 8i; j 2 C(g); i and j are directly or indirectly connected and
8i; k such that i 2 C(g) and k 2 NnC(g), i and k are not connected either
directly or indirectly.
For a network g, let m  1 be the number of components in g. The
partition in components is denoted by
P (g) = fC1(g); C2(g); :::; Cm (g)g :
Next we distinguish between components which are symmetric and com-
ponents which are not: when a component is symmetric, any pair of agents
in the component who are directly linked have the same number of total
links. A fully interconnected component is a special case of a symmetric
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component: in particular a fully interconnected component of size m is a
symmetric component where all agents have (m  1) links. We call a com-
ponent asymmetric whenever it is not symmetric.
Denition 3 (Symmetric Component) A component C(g) is called sym-
metric if 8i; j 2 C(g) such that ij 2 g, ni = nj.
Denition 4 (Asymmetric Component) A component C(g) is called asym-
metric if 9i; j 2 C(g) such that ij 2 g and ni 6= nj.
We are now ready to state our rst characterisation of pairwise stable
labour-sharing networks: if a pairwise stable network admits a component
where all agents are of identical quality, then that component must be sym-
metric. Conversely, any asymmetric component in a pairwise stable network
is given by a set of agents with di¤ering qualities. This is the key testable
implication of our theory that will later on be taken to the data. More
formally:
Proposition 1 Given any pairwise stable network of labour-sharing arrange-
ments g, if there is a C (g) 2 P (g) such that 8i 2 C (g), qi = q, then C(g)
is symmetric.
Proof. See appendix.
Hence whenever agents who are equally endowed enter in a labour-
sharing arrangement, they do so with farmers who have the same number
of total links as they have.
We can go further and show that homogeneous components of pairwise
stable networks of labour sharing arrangements are fully interconnected. In
a component of farmers of the same quality, everyone is directly linked to
everyone else.
Corollary 1 Given any pairwise stable network of labour-sharing arrange-
ments g, if there is a C(g) 2 P (g) such that 8i 2 C(g); qi = q, then C (g) is
complete, i.e. 8i; j 2 C(g) gij = 110:
Proof. See appendix.
The result in proposition 1 provides us with a characterisation of asym-
metric components: if farmers with di¤erent numbers of total links agree to
link up, it must be the case that they are heterogenous.
Corollary 2 Given any pairwise stable network of labour-sharing arrange-
ments g, if 9C (g) 2 P (g) such that C (g) is asymmetric, then 9i; j 2 C (g),
such that ij 2 g and qi 6= qj :
10We would like to thank Natalie Quinn for pointing this out.
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Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 gives us a su¢ cient condition for a symmetric component,
not a necessary one. Hence we might still have components of pairwise
stable networks that allow for heterogeneity of labour quality. However, if
a component of a pairwise stable network is symmetric, the heterogeneity
cannot be very large.
Proposition 2 provides us with a characterisation.
Proposition 2 Given any pairwise stable network of labour-sharing arrange-
ments g, if C (g) 2 P (g) is symmetric, then, for each agent i 2 C(g), the
deviation of the quality of the weakest neighbour of i from the average quality
of is neighbours, is bounded above by
qi   qbj < n+ qbj   1n
where n is the degree of the symmetric component and bj = argminjfqjgj:ij2g.
Proof. See appendix.
Through propositions 1 and 2 we have shown that pairwise stability is
only compatible with the following: homogeneity gives us symmetric compo-
nents; on the other hand, for a component to be symmetric, quality cannot
be too heterogeneous. This characterisation also implies (corollary 2) that
if a pairwise stable network admits asymmetric components, these must be
such that participants are su¢ ciently heterogenous. The following example
establishes that asymmetric components can be part of a pairwise stable
network architecture. Hence it shows that the case of corollary 2 is not just
hypothetical.
Consider the following network where 8 agents form three separate com-
ponents: a star and two pairs.
1
1
1
1
1
q
q q
Assume that quality can only take two values so that qi 2 f1; qg. In the
diagram above each node is labelled with the corresponding quality.
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It is easy to show that such a network, which comprises both symmetric
and asymmetric components, is pairwise stable as long as 203  q  12. The
upper bound on q is needed so that the hub in the asymmetric component
agrees to be linked at all; the lower bound guarantees a high level of hetero-
geneity among participants to the asymmetric component. It can be showed
that if the hub is su¢ ciently stronger than each of the spokes, these are not
only happy to maintain their links with the hub, but also are not inclined to
link up between them, so that asymmetry in the number of links is indeed
pairwise stable.
We should emphasise that equilibrium (here pairwise stable) networks
are typically ine¢ cient. This should not be surprising given that there are
negative network externalities in place. When individually optimising in
deciding whether or not to form a new link, farmers do not internalise the
loss that their connection causes for their existing partners. In equilibrium
we will observe more labour-sharing than it is optimal. For example: among
homogenous farmers, the aggregate payo¤ is maximised whenever labour-
sharing occurs in pairs and it decreases monotonically whenever more farm-
ers join in the work-party. Individual incentives to labour-share, however, do
not work in the direction of minimising the size of the labour-sharing group
and no farmer has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from an arrange-
ment, no matter how large the symmetric component. Such tension between
pairwise stability and e¢ ciency is somewhat mitigated within asymmetric
components, where the willingness of the spokes to join in the work-party de-
creases rapidly with the size of the star. Hence for asymmetric components,
stability requirements pose some bound on the level of overconnectedness
(and ine¢ ciency) that one would observe in equilibrium.
In summary, the theoretical framework and results from this section
provide a number of testable implications. We have characterised labour
sharing as the outcome of (pairwise stable) network formation with nega-
tive externalities, given our assumption about the value of output for farm-
ers in a network. Consequently, the amount of debo (or wonfel) labour a
farmer is able to generate is increasing in the number of his own links but
decreasing in the amount of links his partners have. The model allows for
multiple equilibria so a simple direct test of our network formation model is
not possible: any initial distribution of endowments could lead to multiple
equilibrium congurations. The route taken is to consider the features of
the equilibrium characterisation and take these to the data. Propositions
1 and 2 lead us to a key testable hypothesis: in equilibrium, asymmetric
networks are necessarily heterogenous while symmetric networks tend to be
more homogenous in the quality of endowments. Increased heterogeneity
in the quality of the network partners is only compatible with asymmetric
structures. Also, as suggested by corollary 1, homogeneous groups are not
only symmetric but also highly clustered.
Finally, notice that our model allows for the fact that some farmers may
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not link at all. When this happens, it does not depend uniquely on the en-
dowments and characteristics of the isolated farmer, but also on the specic
network architecture that emerges among those who link; in particular, the
same farmer may be isolated in some equilibria and not in others. For this
reason we do not conduct an empirical test of who is likely to belong to
a labour-sharing network and who is not, and we instead focus on testing
for those who belong to a network whether the observed network architec-
ture conforms to those properties that our model predicts for equilibrium
networks.
4 The Data
The data used in this paper come from the second round of the Ethiopian
Rural Household Survey, conducted in 1994. This is a panel data survey
conducted by the Economics Department of Addis Ababa University in col-
laboration with the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford
University. It covers 15 villages, representative of di¤erent areas and agro-
ecological zones across the country, and a total of 1477 households were
interviewed. The survey has detailed socio-economic information on house-
holds, including consumption, incomes, productive activities, assets and de-
mographics. The second round of this survey is particularly useful for our
purposes since households were asked specic questions about the local net-
works they participate in. Surveys in these areas were supplemented by
anthropological data on the character of these institutions. Since the ques-
tions on local networks were posed only once, we cannot exploit the panel
nature of the data. However, we do use information on endowments and
household structure obtained in the rst round of data collection, about
6-8 months previous to the second round. The data collected pertain to
the harvest in the main season, the meher, and hence the arrangements in
place also refer to this period. In the sample, labour-sharing (debo/wonfel)
is very common in all but the two most Northern (Tigrayan) villages. In
these two villages and the surrounding region, labour-sharing and most of
the other informal institutions, such as rotating savings and credit associa-
tions, funeral groups and forms of sharecropping, common throughout rural
Ethiopia, were not at all prevalent and were of forms not comparable to the
other areas of Ethiopia11 These two villages were excluded from the analysis.
Since the focus of our analysis is the formation of particular groups within
well-dened communities, excluding these villages is not a problem12.
11The main reason for the absence of work parties is ascribed to the very small land
holdings in these areas and the perception that family labour is su¢ cient. These areas
also report that labour sharing is rare in general. They also conrm that the lack of labour
sharing arrangements is not particular to the year surveyed.
12The data sections on labour sharing were completed for 1323 households of the re-
maining sample, which forms the basic sample for identifying matched networks.
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The data were suitable for further analysis of networks because house-
holds were asked whether they had hosted a labour-sharing party in the
main (meher) season, the number of people invited, and the identities of
the people called. The names thus recorded were later matched against the
sample roster. If the names matched a sampled household, the name was
coded with the appropriate sample identication. If they were not part of
the sample they were given a generic code. This in turn means that we
have information on the total number of links of every household in the
sample but not all the identities of their links. The sample per village is
usually about 30% or more of the total population, and this has allowed us
to obtain information on one or more of the network partners of most of the
sampled households. The striking advantage of this matching process is that
in large part we have complete information on the endowments, household
structures, production and consumption of a sample of the partners in the
labour sharing network13. This is the information that will prove crucial
in describing network formation for labour sharing. We discuss the impli-
cations for our classication of network structures and for the econometric
tests further below but rst turn to a discussion of the important role that
labour-sharing plays in production in these villages.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on labour-sharing in the
sample. We nd that 64% of farmers were involved in a work party in this
season. Debo/wonfel labour constituted about 16% of the labour supplied
(in person-days) on the farm. In contrast, even though about a third of
households used some hired labour, labour against cash or in-kind payment
constituted only about 6% of total days supplied. The table also gives details
by land-labour ratios (in terms of endowments). Here we notice that these
labour transactions are not simply driven by endowment di¤erences in terms
of land-labour ratios. While there is some di¤erence in participation and use
by those with relatively less land, debo/wonfel labour shares in total labour
are not very di¤erent across the land-labour distribution. Being reciprocal in
nature, a debo/wonfel is not suitable for balancing land-labour ratios. This
is reected in our labour-sharing data: 83% of those who called a work party
also worked for other farmers during the same season14. In the sample we
found that the median size of a labour-sharing group is 6 people, although
some are much larger. They mostly consist of other farmers in the village,
often relatives (45% were relatives of the farmer).
13The villages in the study are often in remote settings and mimic island economies.
However, even within villages that are closer to towns in this sample, labour-sharing (and
other) transactions are almost entirely organised within the village so that the probability
of capturing the nodes of the network within the village is high.
14A further inspection of the data suggested that actual factor use intensities were much
more similar across the distribution of land-labour endowments, as one would expect with
factor market transactions. Labour market and labour sharing are not responsible for it:
it is largely achieved by sharecropping arrangements and adjustment in own family labour
supply.
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Table 1: Labour sharing and contribution to labour in agriculture
0 - 0.19
ha/adult
0.19-0.62
ha/adult
 0.62
ha/adults
All
Involved in labour parties (%) 59 70 68 64
Shared labour (% of tot. labour) 13 18 16 16
Hired labour (% of tot. labour) 7 5 6 6
Network architectures are dened as symmetric if the number of links of
ones partners is (approximately) equal to the number of links one has. We
classify 128 networks as symmetric, of which 28 were perfectly symmetric
in that the number of links of each of the partners was identical. Networks
were also classied as symmetric if the di¤erence between the total num-
ber of links of the household and the total number of links of each of its
partners was systematically small. In particular, we include those house-
holds as symmetric if the highest di¤erence in links with any of its partners
was lower than the lowest number of links in that network, provided the
network consisted of at least 4 partners15. Below, we report the impact of
changing this denition. All other networks are treated as asymmetric16.
Within asymmetric networks, we further distinguish hubs where households
have more links than their neighbours; and spokes, who are linked through
hubs and so have far fewer links than their (hub) neighbours. We contrast
these households to those who reported that they had not called a labour
sharing party. Table 2 provides a summary of average characteristics for
the 1323 households in the sample. This includes 551 households for whom
we have su¢ cient (matched) information from within the sample to identify
their network architecture; 477 households with no labour-sharing links; 295
households with labour-sharing links (22% of the households) but for whom
no partners could be identied within the sample and so remain unclassied.
Recall that our model predicts that homogeneous components are not
only symmetric, but also complete (i.e. fully interconnected). For each
household, we obtain a measurement of the level of interconnectedness among
the households neighbours through the clustering coe¢ cient. This is dened
as the ratio of existing links connecting each households neighbors to each
15The limit of 4 partners is to avoid counting as symmetric small networks with unequal
number of partners and therefore clearly asymmetric.
16We also attempted to map this to the type of arrangement specied by village but
this was made more di¢ cult by the plethora of local names and missing information on
type. The local names for these arrangements vary by village and the classication is
rendered particularly di¢ cult because in non-Amhara villages, the local names are often
transcribed in Amharic as debo even though, when asked to describe the structure, the
description corresponds to the Amhara wonfel.
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other to the maximum possible number of such links. The clustering coe¢ -
cient ranges between 0 and 1: it is equal to one when all of the households
neighbours are also linked to each other, so that the local neighbourhood of
the household is dense (or clustered); if the clustering coe¢ cient is small,
this implies that the local neighbourhood of the household is rather sparse,
with only few neighbours linked to each other (if at all). A clustering coe¢ -
cient of zero implies that the network is minimally connected, and there are
no direct links between any two neighbours of the same household.
We nd that households belonging to networks that we classify as sym-
metric have a very high clustering coe¢ cient (0.90 on average); on the
other hand, households belonging to networks that we classify as asymmetric
present a signicantly lower clustering, with an average of 0.5.
This nding suggests that symmetric structures also tend to be heavily
clustered: households who belong to symmetric components rely on the same
set of neighbours for labour-sharing. While providing additional evidence in
support of our theoretical framework, this result also constitutes a further
robustness check on our classication between symmetric and asymmetric
structures: we are indeed classifying households in the direction suggested
by the theory.
Beyond the number of links of the household, the characteristics in-
cluded are possibly reecting di¤erences in own labour quality and other
endowments a¤ecting productivity. Age and sex of the household head are
included, as well as the number of adults (above 15 years of age) and the
average education of the adults in the household. The latter is measured in
years, and as can be seen in table 2, education levels of adults are still ex-
tremely low - across the sample below 2 years per adult. A key characteristic
for our purposes is a direct measure of labour quality and strength, based
on questions related to activities of daily living (functionings). Each adult
in the household was asked whether they could perform ve basic tasks,
scoring them from 1 (easily) to 4 (not at all). The tasks were: standing up
after sitting down; sweeping the oor; walking for 5 km; carrying 20 liters
of water for 20 meters; hoeing a eld for a morning. A simple average score
was rescaled to a score between 0 and 1 (best). The score used here is the
average score per adult in the household17. Finally, other endowments are
included, such as land per adult and livestock values per adult.
A simple comparison of the characteristics reported in table 2, using
pairwise t-tests and 5 percent signicance levels, reveals that those without
links are di¤erent from all the other categories in that the household head is
older, they have fewer adults and lower labour quality in terms of strength.
Given that labour-sharing is a reciprocal arrangement, these households
may simply not be able to participate in work parties. The di¤erences
between households across architectures are less pronounced, except in terms
17Gertler and Gruber use a similar index [21].
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the number of links. Symmetric networks tend to be signicantly smaller
than asymmetric networks, but hubs have systematically more links than
members of symmetric components, while spokes have less than either. It
does appear that households in symmetric networks have signicantly less
land per adult than both hubs and spokes. A further check is to distinguish
those classied as exactly symmetric and other symmetric. (Recall that the
latter group was dened on the basis of those for whom the highest di¤erence
in links with any of its partners was lower than the lowest number of links of
the household and of any of its partners). The former group is small - only
28 households, but in comparing their labour characteristics to the others,
it was found that they were not signicantly di¤erent for any reasonable
signicance levels. In the regression analysis below, further robustness tests
are reported, to check whether the classication rule adopted here matters
substantially in interpreting the results.
Network architectures are also not particularly linked to substantially
higher labour contributions in particular tasks. Labour sharing networks
in these villages were employed largely for weeding and harvesting with
the share of debo/wonfel labour called for ploughing or construction being
negligible. Labour from network members contributes slightly more labour
as a proportion of total labour for symmetric networks (21 percent versus
18 percent), and the percentage of households using labour sharing groups
for weeding is slightly higher in symmetric than in asymmetric groups (59
versus 49 percent), but the di¤erences are not signicant at 5 percent. Both
types of architectures, symmetric and asymmetric are associated with similar
labour allocations, and with both types of tasks (weeding and harvesting).
The type of task does not seem to drive the choice of network architecture.
A further critical issue is the degree to which information missing on
links of neighbours (where they are not part of the household sample) a¤ects
the classication into architectures. Note that architectures are determined
by total number of links of the household and that of its partners in the
arrangement. In most villages, over 30% of the village forms the sample
and in some cases, about three-quarters of the village was surveyed, which
allowed us to map at least two or more partners. Overall, we managed to
identify network partners for more than two-thirds of the labour sharing
groups. Due to the sampling procedure, small networks are more likely to
be under-sampled, since the probability that at least one of the partners is
in the sample is higher for larger work parties. This appears to be conrmed
in the data, with a low mean (and median) of 3 partners for those networks
for whom we have no information on partnerscharacteristics. Important
for our purposes, t-tests of di¤erences in mean characteristics in table 2
show that those households lacking information on network partners are not
systematically di¤erent from any of the classied households. In terms of
the number of links and land owned per adult, they are similar to symmetric
groups (and di¤erent to the other groups), but not systematically similar
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to one of the groups in terms of other characteristics, suggesting (at least
on the basis of observables) that no systematic bias is introduced by their
exclusion18.
In any case given the scope of our analysis, the issues with only having
a (possibly non-random) sample of networks for analysis is less serious than
may seem at rst. We do not aim to predict which network will form in
a village, not least since our theoretical framework suggests that multiple
equilibria are possible and therefore makes no particular predictions about
which particular network should be observed in a village, among a (random)
sample of households. Our interest lies in testing predictions about the
characterisation of any equilibrium that may have emerged, by examining
the architecture of networks and the correlates of its membership.
5 Empirical Characterisation of Equilibria
The aim of this section is to examine the empirical implications of the theory
and ask whether the characterisation of the equilibrium in Section 3 is borne
out by the data. We have characterised labour sharing as the outcome of
(pairwise stable) network formation with negative externalities, given our
assumption about the value of output for farmers in a network. The return
to debo labour a farmer is able to generate is increasing in the number of his
own links but decreasing in the number of links his partners have. Recall
again that the model allows for multiple equilibria so that it is not possible
to perform a direct test of our network formation model: for any given
initial distribution of endowments, multiple equilibrium congurations could
emerge. Nevertheless, in this section, particular features of the theoretical
characterisation of equilibria can be tested. The key testable result is that
asymmetric networks are more heterogeneous in the quality of endowments,
since heterogeneity in the quality of the network partners is only compatible
with asymmetric networks.
We begin by exploring the link between heterogeneity in labour quality
(and other related characteristics) and the architecture of these groups. Ta-
ble 3 provides basic descriptive statistics about the partners in symmetric
and asymmetric networks. We use a number of denitions of heterogene-
ity, to show the robustness of any interpretation on the basis of descriptive
statistics, before exploring them further through multivariate analysis in the
next section. In particular, we report the results using the following possi-
ble notions of heterogeneity: the standard deviation of each characteristic
among network members; the coe¢ cient of variation; the mean absolute de-
viation of each members characteristics; the di¤erence between the mean of
18There are also no signicant di¤erences in the tasks for which these groups are used
nor the extent of labour allocation between the unidentied groups and the networks with
matched data.
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a characteristic across the network partners less the value of the character-
istic for the least endowedmember (as implicit in the functional form in
proposition 2). For comparison, the rst column presents the mean of each
characteristic across network partners. For each of these measures of hetero-
geneity, we conduct a simple t-test of whether symmetric and asymmetric
networks di¤er in the level of heterogeneity: di¤erences signicant at 5 per-
cent are marked by an asterisk. The table demonstrates that there are no
systematic di¤erences in the mean characteristics between the two types of
architecture, except that symmetric networks appear to consist of members
with less land on average. There is no straightforward explanation for this,
but it suggests that any multivariate exploration should control for mean
land areas per adult. In terms of the di¤erent denitions of heterogeneity,
the results are strong and robust. First, consider two of the characteris-
tics reecting labour quality: education and functionings (strength). For all
measures, symmetric networks have lower heterogeneity, exactly as predicted
by the theory. Furthermore, in all cases, the heterogeneity in the age of the
head and whether the network consists of male headed households, is lower
for symmetric networks, and mostly signicantly so. Finally, the heterogene-
ity in two wealthrelated endowment characteristics, land and livestock per
adult, is also lower for symmetric networks. These could possibly reect
past higher quality of labour, or, as in nutrition-productivity relationships,
feeding into current higher quality of labour, and therefore again consistent
with our narrative. Only in the case of adults in the household, is the het-
erogeneity (just about) signicantly larger in symmetric networks, but then
only when using the standard deviation as a measure and not in any of the
other measures of heterogeneity. Overall, the results are strongly suggestive
of the theoretical setup and this is explored further in the regression analysis
below.
The regressions in table 4 explore network architecture, assessing the
role of heterogeneity amongst partners, controlling for other endowments
and characteristics. Furthermore, since each village may have converged to
a particular equilibrium out of many, it appears important to assess these
correlations controlling for village xed e¤ects. Given that the theory sug-
gests a trade-o¤ between heterogeneity in quality and endowments on the
one hand, and symmetry of the network architecture on the other, we rst
present a simple probit regression model, denoting by 1 that a household
is in a symmetric network, and zero if it is in an asymmetric network, to
check whether this trade-o¤ is observed. The sample consists of the 551
households with matched data on partners. The advantage of exploring this
further in a multivariate framework is our ability to o¤er some controls for
a number of household characteristics and community xed e¤ects, thereby
ensuring that the correlations observed in table 3 are not simply driven by
these observables, and then possibly unrelated to issues of heterogeneity.
The variables used are household characteristics as in table 2: charac-
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teristics of the head (age and whether male), labour quantity and quality
(number of adults in the households, the average number of years of edu-
cation among the adults and the average functionings score per adult) and
wealth characteristics, in particular land per adult and livestock holdings per
adult. The latter is by far the most important liquid asset while other as-
sets such as durables constitute only a very small proportion of total wealth.
The same characteristics, but now in terms of the heterogeneity among all
the network partners, are also included (as in table 3). Note that all these
variables may have a bearing on labour quality, directly or (as in the case
of wealth) indirectly (for example, wealth accumulated linked to being a
stronger farmer). However, the most direct measure of labour quality is
the functionings score, which is thus the main variable of interest. Finally,
the regressions also control for mean characteristics of the network partners
in terms of land per adult, thus purging any technology e¤ects of land-
labour ratios. Including other mean characteristics of network partners left
the results qualitatively una¤ected.
The regressions (in Table 4) were run for a number of di¤erent mea-
sures of heterogeneity as in table 3. Alternative regressions, also including
levels and heterogeneity in other characteristics of the head (education, func-
tionings) or measures of adult labour, separating males from females, gave
similar results. The regressions clearly conrm the ndings from table 3.
There is signicant negative correlation between the heterogeneity in labour
quality, measured in terms of functionings among all network partners, and
the probability of being in a symmetric network, irrespective of the measure
of heterogeneity. A similar negative correlation is observed for heterogene-
ity amongst network partners in land and livestock holdings, which, as was
argued before, could be a reection of labour quality di¤erences. The re-
gressions nd signicant e¤ects for some of the controls, most notably own
livestock holdings and mean land holdings of network partners (as well as
the community xed e¤ects which are not reported). There is some positive
correlation with heterogeneity in terms of number of adults in each partner
household but this is insignicant in all the specications. However, most
important for our purposes is that the negative impact of heterogeneity in
labour quality is maintained despite these controls.
An issue of concern is whether the classication into symmetric and
asymmetric groups is measured with error, since some larger groups were
classied as symmetric if the number of links between partners is approxi-
mately the same, rather than exactly so. Two robustness tests are presented
in Table 5. The rst check is to look at the determinants of having di¤er-
ences in links, e¤ectively studying the correlates of increasing deviations
from symmetry. The left hand side is the mean di¤erence in number of links
between the household and its partners - a measure of increasing asymmetry,
bounded at zero, with pure symmetric groups having no di¤erence at all.
A tobit model is used in the estimation. Under the null that heterogeneity
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among partners reduces the probability of symmetry, this would suggest a
positive correlation between the left hand side and di¤erent measures of het-
erogeneity. The second robustness check, in the last 3 columns of Table 5,
compares the relatively small group (28 networks) of strictly symmetric net-
works where linked farmers have exactly the same number of links with the
rest of the sample. We use a probit model where the value 1 denotes strictly
symmetric networks. In both regressions, the right hand side variables are
as the same as before.
These results appear to conrm the earlier ndings, with the signs of
the variables of interest as before, even though not always as signicant.
Nevertheless, using mean di¤erence in links, heterogeneity in labour quality
characteristics such as education and functionings as well as male headship
and land areas among network partners are positively correlated with higher
asymmetry, showing the robustness of the results in Tables 3 and 4. Even
running a probit regression, using a base group of 28 in a sample of close
to 400 groups still gives signicant negative correlations between symmetry
and heterogeneity, related to male headship and land, while negative (but
insignicant) coe¢ cients of similar order of magnitude as in table 4 can be
found for functionings and education19.
This section has shown that some predictions can be made from theory
about network architectures and the composition of networks, beyond issues
of network size. The underlying idea that network architectures matter is
next used to illuminate discussions of the impact of networks on economic
performance.
6 Empirical Illustration: The role of architecture
in performance
So far, we have described the relationship between network structures and
the distribution of endowments within these structures. But does network
architecture matter for outcomes? Given that households have incentives
to form labour sharing links, it is useful to explore the impact of networks
on observed economic performance (in terms of output generated by these
farmers). In this section, we aim to show, in an empirical examination
of the relationship between outcomes and networks, not only that network
links matter but more particularly that network architecture matters. The
main lesson from this is that a narrow focus on the number of links (as the
approach taken in Putnam [37]) may lead to biased results. The sample
suitable for this analysis contains those households classied as in either
symmetric or asymmetric networks for which we have information (i.e. the
19The sample size is smaller than in table 4 because in some villages no symmetric
groups dened as in these regressions can be observed so that these observations were
dropped given the community xed e¤ects formulation used.
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sample used in the previous section).
The key issue of interest is to show that in this particular sample, net-
work architecture is correlated with performance, controlling for the number
of links. Furthermore, we show that inference on the impact of the social
networks will be incorrect if network architecture is not included in the re-
gression. The regression is a standard (Cobb-Douglas) production function
augmented for land quality, human capital, further household characteris-
tics and network variables. Our focus here is on the network variables. The
total value of the harvest in the main season is regressed on land and adult
labour, all expressed in logarithms. Adult labour is included both as levels
of labour available in the household and as a weighted average of adults
with the weights reecting their functioning scores, thus providing simple
labour "e¢ ciency" units. In particular, recall that the functionings index is
the score, scaled between 0 and 1, with one if the individual can perform all
tasks of daily living without any problem, and zero if none can be performed,
providing a simple weight for counting adults. Other labour characteristics
are also included, such as the age of the head and the average education
(in years) of the adults in the household. Given the crucial role of oxen in
the farming system and the possible contribution of manure, the value of
livestock is also included in the regression. Land quality is di¤erent across
farmers, and the survey data contains detailed information on both slope
and quality of land, using well-dened local characterisations. Thus the
share of land of each quality and slope is included in the specication. In all
regressions (see table 6), land and quality weighted labour are strongly sig-
nicant. Once quality corrected adult labour is included, the total number
of adults is not signicant. Male headship increases returns, as does higher
land quality and both are signicant (with higher returns for lem land,
which denotes the best land using local self-reported characterisations). Fi-
nally, all regressions control for village xed e¤ects. All these e¤ects are
robust across the di¤erent specications.
Turning to the impact of networks, we use two di¤erent specications.
The rst specication includes the (log of the) number of links and whether
the architecture is symmetric or asymmetric to examine the impact of net-
works. In the second specication we explore the impact of rening archi-
tectures further by distinguishing hubs from spokes among the asymmetric
networks, by including a dummy for each of these two, and dening sym-
metricas the base group.
When addressing the role of networks on outcomes, the issue of endogene-
ity is vital. Until recently, the empirical literature on the impact of social
capital (or more narrowly, network membership) on outcomes has largely
assumed that networks are exogenous. For networks dened by ethnicity or
gender this might be appropriate. However, in other contexts, individuals
do choose the agents they want to interact with, so that the network struc-
ture is part of the outcome that we aim to explain. To the extent that the
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formation of networks is endogenous to its function, it is clear that empiri-
cal studies might be misleading about the impact of being in a network on
outcomes.
From an empirical point of view, our interest lies not only in reconciling
the particular network structures that emerge with a model of endogenous
network formation but also in examining whether the endogeneity of the
network formation process has bite in determining outcomes of interest. To
put it simply, the issue is not only whether one believes that those with
higher productivity, for instance, choose to be in a particular network but
also whether the unobservable components of such a decision are correlated
strongly enough with outcomes for this to have an econometric impact.
The main econometric concerns in estimating the e¤ects of membership
in a labour sharing network on productivity are akin to the general problem
of estimating the e¤ects of belonging to some groupon individual outcomes.
For instance, estimates of the e¤ects on educational attainment due to peers
are bedevilled by the di¢ culty of identifying how much of the variation
in attainment is actually due to peer e¤ects and how much is driven by
di¤erences in individual characteristics. The main critique is that group (or
network) characteristics are endogenous (or correlated with the errors) in
such regressions. In particular, if members of a labour sharing network have
chosen to come together precisely because they generate a certain synergy in
weeding or harvesting as a group, then taking the amount of shared labour
as exogenous will obtain biased estimates of the impact of such labour on
output.
Instruments used for networks are a number of variables which are un-
likely to inuence productivity directly, but that may matter for network
formation. We include rst the number of close blood relatives living in the
village (on average each household has about 2 blood relatives in the village),
whether the household head was born in the village (just over half of the
heads were born in the village), the average number of years of residence of
the head of household in the village20. These variables may all suggest how
strongly the household is embedded in the village and reect its relative role
and position in the village. Furthermore, since network formation ought to
be inuenced by the pool of available partners for local networks, we also
include locational xed e¤ects based on the neighbourhood. In particular,
in each village, we identied (village-dened) geographical neighbourhoods,
and checked in which quarters/neighbourhoods each household lived. We
identied about 70 neighbourhoods in total across the 15 clusters in our sam-
ple. These neighbourhood xed e¤ects may also reect local land quality,
but this is controlled for directly at the household level using the land qual-
20 In rural Ethiopia, mobility is low because rights in land are user rights granted by
the Government. Leaving the village will lose one ones entitlement to land, so in general
years of residence di¤er from age mainly because of exogenous circumstances.
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ity variables21. Note that there are exactly two endogenous variables and
so our minimal set consists of the number of blood relatives and the neigh-
bourhood e¤ects. The variables on birth and years of residence are used for
the overidentication tests but it must be emphasised that the results are
una¤ected by this small expansion in the number of instruments.
Obtaining credible instruments is not an easy task, and we test whether
the instruments used are both relevant and valid. We present 3 regressions
in Table 6: the rst column provides OLS estimates of parameters, using
links and architecture. This can be compared to the last two columns that
provide the estimates for the impact of networks, where both links and archi-
tecture are instrumented for. Column 2 thus presents IV estimates for links
and whether the architecture is asymmetric, while Column 3 examines the
impact of describing architectures more precisely as hubs and spokes, rela-
tive to being symmetric. The instrumentation employs a two-step e¢ cient
GMM22 estimator, in preference to the standard 2SLS, mainly because the
endogenous variables are discrete in nature and while the 2SLS estimator
remains consistent, one is concerned with the likelihood of heteroscedastic-
ity in this situation. If heteroscedasticity is present, the GMM estimator
is more e¢ cient than the simple IV - and if not, is no worse. The tests
suggest that heteroscedasticity is a concern and hence the GMM results are
preferred, but the standard IV estimates provide similar point estimates of
the coe¢ cients. The tests for heteroscedasticity report the Pagan-Hall [36]
test statistics and suggest heteroscedasticity in all specications.
Are the instruments relevant? The F statistics on the rst stage regres-
sions (presented in Table 6A and 6B) are highly signicant with p-values of
0.03 for both the number of links and architecture. Since, we have multiple
endogenous regressors, we present the Shea partial correlation coe¢ cients
that take the intercorrelations between instruments into account, as well
as the standard R2 and F-test of the joint signicance. If both the Shea
and the standard partial correlation coe¢ cients yield similar results, then
instruments are more likely to be relevant. The Shea and the standard R2
are respectively 0.13 and 0.12 for the number of links, 0.18 and 0.19 for
symmetric architectures, and 0.15 and 0.14 for both spokes and hubs, sug-
gesting that the instruments are undoubtedly relevant. For comparison, the
rst stage-F statistics are signicant for the number of links with p-values
of 0.03 and for architectures, with p-values of 0.004.
Are the instruments valid? Are the instruments orthogonal to the error
term? The results of Hansens J-test in the context of the GMM estimates
21The total sample size reduces to 404 because some households could not be fully
identied in terms of neighbourhoods. However, the uninstrumented regressions on the
full sample yielded virtually identical results so the loss of these observations is not likely
to be a cause for major concern.
22This estimator is also referred to as the heteroscedastic two-stage least squares (David-
son and Mackinnon, [10] p. 599).
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(the value of GMM objective function evaluated at the e¢ cient estimator) in
both sets of regressions suggest that the null hypothesis that the instruments
are valid cannot be rejected, with p-values of 0.20.
Note that we have taken care to restrict the instrument set to variables
that capture ones own position in the village and general characteristics
of the neighbourhood from where potential partners might be drawn rather
than specic features of the network one belongs to. Hence we believe they
are plausible.
We now turn to an examination of the coe¢ cients in each regression.
The results in table 6 provide interesting reading on the relevance of both
number of connections and network architecture. The rst column shows
that links (size) matter: more links provide a higher return, with one percent
more links giving 16 percent more returns while the measure of architecture
as in whether the network is asymmetric suggests that it has a positive and
signicant e¤ect, with similar returns. However, after instrumenting, these
e¤ects stay strongly signicant, while the impact of links almost trebles to
about 0.4. The impact of asymmetry is higher, o¤ering about 43% higher
returns in output: asymmetric networks in this sample (controlling for total
links, and village xed e¤ects) lead to substantially higher returns. Architec-
ture matters, over and above the number of connections. This is conrmed
by exploring this further, by distinguishing hubs from spokes among asym-
metric networks (with symmetry the base category as before). Without
instrumenting, the pattern is that only hubs are signicant. But after in-
strumenting, both the hub and spoke dummies are signicant, as are total
links. The size of the coe¢ cients on hubs and spokes are similar and indeed
not signicantly di¤erent (a chi-square test of di¤erence fails to reject the
null hypothesis of no di¤erence, at a p-value of 0.7), suggesting that the
specication in column 3 is the parsimonious specication: asymmetry or
not appears to matter most in this sample.
From a theoretical perspective it is very hard to compare the payo¤
that a farmer would get in symmetric versus asymmetric networks. It is so
because of the very large number of asymmetric networks which are feasible.
However we note that a household who belongs to a work-party that is totally
asymmetric (a star) would be strictly better o¤ as a spoke in the star rather
than as a member of a similarly sized symmetric network, as long as the hub
is su¢ ciently well endowed. Also, as emphasised earlier, the tendency to
connect more than it is optimal is mitigated in asymmetric networks by the
fact that the spokes willingness to join in the work-party decreases rapidly
with the size of the component. As a result, the ine¢ ciencies caused by the
presence of negative network externalities may well be lower in asymmetric
compared to symmetric networks.
From an empirical perspective, it is clear that instrumentation raises
the coe¢ cients on the network variables, suggesting that the unobservable
components of the decision to sort into particular kinds of networks are
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negatively correlated with the network variables. It is interesting to spec-
ulate (if hard to establish) what these unobservable components might be.
One aspect of network structures that is tradionally seen as di¢ cult to cap-
ture is the notion of social cohesion23. Denitions of this in the sociological
literature seem to share the common intuitive core resting on how well a
group is held together Moody and White [31] dene a group as cohesive to
the extent that multiple independent social relations among multiple mem-
bers of the group hold it together. They go on to say that group cohesion
might be captured by the number of independent paths linking each pair
of agents in the group. Hence it appears that this sociological notion of
cohesion might be related to the degree of connectedness of a graph. A
connected graph (i.e. a component within a network) can range from being
completely connected, where all agents are directly linked to every other
agent, to minimally connected, where all agents are indirectly connected
through the minimum number of links and there is a single path connecting
any two agents. An example of minimally connected graph is the star net-
work. Hence the star can be thought of as possessing a low level of social
cohesion, since if any of the links fail, the network breaks up into more than
one component. On the other hand, the complete network, where all the
agents are connected to each other, displays very high social cohesion since
the group is held together even if more than one link fails. More generally,
symmetric network architectures (of which the complete network is an exam-
ple) are never minimally connected, (with the notable exception of the pair)
- and hence possess a higher level of social cohesion than most asymmet-
ric architectures. Futhermore, the homogeneity displayed within symmetric
structures may also be thought as consonant with the notion of cohesion. In
short, we speculate that cohesion, which is an intrinsic attribute of network
structure might well be the unobservable element, negatively correlated with
asymmetry and possibly driving the under-estimation of the impact of links
and asymmetric structures on outcomes before instrumentation.
The main conclusion from this section is in line with the rest of the paper.
The results conrm strongly that the architecture of a social network, and
not just number of links, has an important role to play in understanding
network formation, and the role of social networks on economic performance.
7 Concluding Remarks
We provide a theoretical framework of endogenous network formation that
yields testable predictions for the network architectures generated by labour-
sharing groups in village economies. We use data from rural Ethiopia to test
the consistency of the empirical evidence with the equilibrium characterisa-
23As Durkheim points out [14]"...social solidarity is a wholly moral phenomenon which
by itself is not amenable to exact observation and especially not to measurement".
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tions predicted by our model.
The hypothesis is that network formation for the purpose of labour shar-
ing is driven by negative network externalities: popular network partners
are also less likely to be available when you need them. We allow for het-
erogeneity amongst agents and capture this empirically by using a direct
measure of physical ability and strength based on questions related the ease
of performing ve basic farming tasks.
As predicted, we nd that heterogeneity in quality is associated with
asymmetric network architectures, while homogeneity is associated with
symmetric structures where network partners have similar number of links.
Furthermore, we examine the impact of networks on output and, in contrast
to the current empirical literature, we demonstrate the critical role of both
number of links and architecture in determining the impact of social net-
works on performance.A narrow focus on links serves to underestimate the
impact of labour-sharing on output. Social capital matters certainly, but its
impact di¤ers by the architecture of the network to which one belongs.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By contradiction. Suppose C (g) is not symmet-
ric. Without loss of generality, assume that i 2 C(g) has the largest number
of links of all members of the component: ni = maxi0 fni0 j i0 2 C(g)g. If
C(g) is not symmetric, then there exists a j 2 C(g) such that ij 2 g and
such that nj < ni. This implies that 9k 2 C(g) such that ik 2 g and jk =2 g.
Since by assumption g is pairwise stable and ik 2 g, then
hk (g)  hk (g   ik)
which implies a fortiori that
hk(g + jk) > hk (g)
in fact if k values his link to i, he should value even more so a link to j,
given that ni > nj . More in detail:
hk (g)  hk (g   ik)() nk + 1 + q
ni + 1
 1
nk
26641 + X
h:hk2g
h 6=i
q
nh + 1
3775
while hk(g + jk) > hk (g) requires:
nk + q + 2
nj + 1
>
1
nk + 1
26641 + X
h:hk2g
h 6=i
q
nh + 1
+
q
ni + 1
3775
31
Since nj < ni we know that
nk + q + 2
nj + 1
>
nk + q + 2
ni + 1
moreover
1
nk
+
1
nk
X
h:hk2g
h 6=i
q
nh + 1
>
1
nk + 1
+
1
nk + 1
2664 X
h:hk2g
h 6=i
q
nh + 1
+
q
ni + 1
3775
in fact 1nk >
1
nk+1
, moreover the expression
1
nk
X
h:hk2g
h 6=i
1
nh + 1
is an average of nk fractions and the expression
1
nk + 1
2664 X
h:hk2g
h 6=i
1
nh + 1
+
1
ni + 1
3775
can be interpreted as the average of (nk + 1) fractions, where the rst nk
elements are the same as in the lhs and the extra element is the smallest
and hence reduces the average. As a result:
hk (g)  hk (g   ik)) hk (g + kj) > hk (g)
Similarly, since g is pairwise stable by assumption and ij 2 g, we know that
hj(g)  hj (g   ij)
We can show that, given that nk  ni then
hj(g)  hj (g   ij)) hj(g + kj)  hj (g)
i.e. if j values his link to i he should value (at least as much) a link to k (the
complete proof is very similar to the one above and it is therefore omitted).
Hence jk =2 g contradicts that g is pairwise stable.
Proof of Corollary 1. By contradiction. Suppose C(g) is not complete.
Then there exist i; j 2 C(g) such that ij =2 g. By pairwise stability this
requires that at least one of the two following inequalities hold: either
hi(g) > hi(g + ij)
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or
hj(g) > hj(g + ij)
The rst inequality requires:
qi
1 + ni
+(1+
qi
1 + ni
)
X
k:ik2g
qk
1 + nk
>
qi
2 + ni
+(1+
qi
2 + ni
)
0@ qj
2 + nj
+
X
k:ik2g
qk
1 + nk
1A
(3)
The second inequality requires:
qj
1 + nj
+(1+
qj
1 + nj
)
X
h:jh2g
qh
1 + nh
>
qj
2 + nj
+(1+
qj
2 + nj
)
0@ qi
2 + ni
+
X
h:jh2g
qh
1 + nh
1A
(4)
By homogeneity of C(g), 8i; qi = q. By proposition 1, 8i; ni = n: Hence
both (3) and (4) can be rewritten as:
q
1 + n
+(1+
q
1 + n
)
X
k:ik2g
q
1 + n
>
q
2 + n
+(1+
q
2 + n
)
0@ q
2 + n
+
X
k:ik2g
q
1 + n
1A
This inequality requires:
2n+ 3n2 + n3 + q < 0
which cannot be veried.
Proof of Corollary 2. This is an immediate corollary of proposition 1.
By contradiction, suppose that 8i; j 2 C(g) such that ij 2 g, qi = qj , then
by proposition 1 it would follow that C(g) is symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 2. C(g) is symmetric by assumption, so that 8i; j 2
C(g) such that ij 2 g, ni = nj = n. Fix bj such that bj = argminj2C(g) fqjg
and consider some i such that ibj 2 g: Pairwise stability of g, requires that
8j : ij 2 g
hi (g)  hi (g   ij)() qj
nj + 1
+
qi
ni + 1
2664 qjnj + 1   1ni
0BB@1 + X
k:ik2g
k 6=j
qk
nk + 1
1CCA
3775  0
(5)
By symmetry of C(g), the inequality above becomes:
qj + qi
2664 qjn+ 1   1n
0BB@1 + X
k:ik2g
k 6=j
qk
n+ 1
1CCA
3775  0
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which can be rewritten as
qj
qi
 1
n
+
1
n
X
k:ik2g
k 6=j
qk
n+ 1
  qj
n+ 1
and by adding and subtracting   1n+1
qj
n :
qj
qi
  1
n
 1
n+ 1
2664 X
k:ik2g
k 6=j
qk
n
+
qj
n
3775  1n+ 1 qjn   qjn+ 1
which becomes
qj
qi
  1
n
 1
n+ 1
(qi   qj) 
1
n+ 1
qj
n
(6)
where qi denotes the average quality of agent is neighbours (including j):
qi =
X
k:ik2g
qk
n
From (6) it follows that:
qi   qj  (n+ 1)

qj
qi
  1
n
+
qj
n (n+ 1)

qi   qj  (n+ 1)

qj
qi
  n+ 1  qj
n(n+ 1)

In particular for bj:
qi   qbj  (n+ 1) qbjqi   n+ 1  qbjn(n+ 1)

< n+
qbj   1
n
Hence the (absolute value of the) deviation of the least endowed neighbour
from the average neighbour of i (in the lhs) is bounded above by the degree
of the symmetric component (n) and by how the endowment of the weakest
neighbour of i compares to 1 (which is the minimum value that we assume
the endowment of a farmer can take). Notice that given that bj is the weakest
farmer in the component, a large value of qbj is only found in high-quality
components.
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Table 2: Characteristics of the household by network architecture 
 
asymmetric networks 
  no links symmetric spoke hub no information 
number of observation 477 128 272 151 295 
  Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
own links 0.00 0.00 6.13 2.78 3.40 2.54 12.06 8.47 4.75 9.57 
male headed? 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.12 
age head? 49.73 16.96 44.62 13.65 43.26 14.01 45.60 15.18 45.43 15.82 
adults 2.84 1.82 3.33 2.05 3.06 1.66 3.50 1.91 3.13 1.98 
education in years per adult 1.47 2.20 1.30 1.89 1.38 2.09 1.51 2.14 1.73 2.37 
functionings score per adult 2.76 0.43 2.84 0.27 2.83 0.33 2.79 0.30 2.82 0.28 
livestock per adult (birr) 448.42 725.26 412.02 506.07 407.19 492.86 488.65 531.97 357.99 476.67 
land per adult 0.33 0.42 0.31 0.28 0.39 0.34 0.38 0.32 0.29 0.32 
Note: own links are the number of network connections of the household. Average education in years per adult in the household. The functionings score is based on the 
average score on activities of daily living questions, scaled between 0 and 1, with 1 denoting best.  Symmetric networks are defined as those networks in which each partner 
has either exactly or approximately the same number of links as the other members of the network. See main text for details. Spokes are networks in which the network 
partners have more partners than the household, while hubs denote those households who have more links than their partners. No information households are those 
households involved in labour sharing networks whose partners could not be matched with other households in the sample. 
 
 
 
Table 3  Characteristics of network partners in labour sharing arrangements 
 Means across partners 
Standard deviation 
across partners 
Coefficient of 
variation across 
partners 
Mean absolute deviation 
from mean across partners 
Bound (deviation from 
mean of ‘lowest’ partner) 
 Symmetric? Diff? Symmetric? Diff? Symmetric? Diff? Symmetric? Diff? Symmetric? Diff 
 No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  
male head? 0.16 0.16  0.09 0.07 * 0.55 0.49  0.06 0.05 * 0.07 0.06 * 
livestock per adult 437.72 407.99  299.09 242.65 * 0.79 0.64 * 216.30 175.77 * 255.05 188.97 * 
land per adult 0.40 0.32 * 0.19 0.13 * 0.53 0.45 * 0.13 0.09 * 0.16 0.11 * 
adults  3.28 3.45  1.20 1.38 * 0.36 0.36  0.88 0.99  1.03 1.06  
Agehead 44.12 44.55  11.14 10.32  0.25 0.23  8.17 7.41  9.90 8.41 * 
education years per adult 1.40 1.33  1.32 1.07 * 1.25 1.11 * 0.96 0.78 * 0.99 0.79 * 
functionings score per adult 2.81 2.83  0.21 0.17 * 0.08 0.06 * 0.16 0.12 * 0.24 0.15 * 
Note: each column gives the indicator for either symmetric (‘yes’)  or asymmetric (‘no’) network components. The ‘diff’ column simply reports whether a 
simple t-test of the difference in the mean between the two groups is significant at 5 percent or less. Variables are defined on the same basis as in table 2. 
T able 4  Multivariate correlations: probit model of network architecture for different measures of heterogeneity (n=491) 
Dependant variable = 1 if structure is asymmetric, 0 otherwise. 
 Standard Deviation 
Mean Absolute 
Deviation 
Bound of 
‘poorest’ partners 
male headed household? 1.349 1.404 1.433 
 [1.84]* [1.91]* [1.53] 
number of adults in household -0.018 -0.013 0.004 
 [0.44] [0.31] [0.09] 
years of education per adult in own household -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 
 [0.36] [0.34] [0.32] 
Functionings score per adult in household 0.132 0.111 -0.028 
 [0.44] [0.36] [0.07] 
land per adult in household -0.815 -0.808 -0.742 
 [1.96]** [1.92]* [1.74]* 
livestock value per adult in household 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.83]* [1.89]* [2.13]** 
heterogeneity in male headship -2.054 -2.802 -2.369 
 [1.78]* [1.82]* [1.26] 
heterogeneity in number of adults 0.128 0.151 0.115 
 [1.93]* [1.59] [1.62] 
heterogeneity in education -0.129 -0.185 -0.134 
 [1.36] [1.48] [1.17] 
heterogeneity in functionings -0.624 -0.929 -1.152 
 [1.77]* [1.99]** [3.21]*** 
heterogeneity in livestock values -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [2.40]** [2.48]** [2.37]** 
heterogeneity in land areas -1.402 -2.138 -2.083 
 [2.96]*** [3.35]*** [3.62]*** 
mean land among partners 1.796 1.862 1.945 
 [2.46]** [2.44]** [2.36]** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Regression controls for village fixed effects and robust, clustered standard errors 
Robust z stats  in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at1% 
 
Table 5 Robustness tests: Tobit model of mean absolute difference in links between household and partners, and Probit model on narrow symmetry definition 
for different definitions of hetereogeneity 
 
Mean absolute difference in links for different 
definition of heterogeneity (tobit model) (n=491) 
Narrow definition of symmetry (29 symmetric 
groups=1) (probit model) (N=397) 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Absolute 
Deviation 
Bound of 
‘poorest’ partners 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Absolute 
Deviation 
Bound of ‘poorest’ 
partners 
male headed household? 1.391 1.296 0.896 0.53 0.55 0.348 
  [0.33] [0.31] [0.21] [0.40] [0.40] [0.25] 
number of adults in household 0.443 0.412 0.307 -0.014 -0.014 -0.022 
  [1.60] [1.48] [1.11] [0.20] [0.19] [0.30] 
years of education per adult in own household -0.11 -0.111 -0.068 -0.101 -0.103 -0.117 
  [0.43] [0.43] [0.26] [1.47] [1.48] [1.71]* 
functionings score per adult in household 0.804 0.904 0.846 0.353 0.327 0.134 
  [0.49] [0.56] [0.54] [0.81] [0.75] [0.30] 
land per adult in household 1.412 1.264 0.475 0.013 0.06 0.27 
  [0.61] [0.55] [0.21] [0.02] [0.08] [0.30] 
livestock value per adult in household 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 
  [1.06] [1.07] [0.87] [0.27] [0.29] [0.33] 
Heterogeneity in male headship 10.834 14.172 13.479 -4.696 -6.655 -7.928 
  [1.69]* [1.62] [1.58] [2.09]** [2.10]** [2.58]*** 
Heterogeneity in number of adults -0.148 -0.073 0.231 -0.108 -0.156 -0.088 
 [0.33] [0.12] [0.41] [1.04] [1.09] [0.66] 
Heterogeneity in education 1.679 2.318 1.559 -0.194 -0.28 -0.187 
  [3.75]*** [3.79]*** [2.63]*** [1.52] [1.56] [1.10] 
Heterogeneity in functionings 3.562 5.352 3.618 -0.237 -0.445 -1.144 
  [1.55] [1.71]* [2.00]** [0.30] [0.40] [1.33] 
Heterogeneity in livestock values 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  [1.18] [1.23] [1.28] [1.00] [0.99] [0.84] 
Heterogeneity in land areas 6.141 8.74 7.96 -2.328 -3.351 -3.562 
  [1.71]* [1.77]* [1.90]* [2.07]** [2.22]** [2.74]*** 
mean land among partners -10.838 -10.948 -10.025 1.954 1.971 2.147 
  [2.75]*** [2.77]*** [2.61]*** [1.70]* [1.70]* [1.66]* 
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.22 0.23 0.27 
Z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 6: Networks and performance – explaining value of agricultural output (in ln) 
  1 2 3 
 
Links & 
Asymmetry 
Links & 
Asymmetry 
Links, Hubs & 
Spokes 
 
Not 
Instrumented 
OLS 
Instrumented 
GMM 
Instrumented 
GMM 
share of land with lem quality 0.48 0.565 0.548 
 [2.59]** [3.27]*** [3.13]*** 
share of land with lem teuf quality 0.143 0.254 0.238 
 [1.19] [1.43] [1.33] 
share land on slope 0.083 -0.412 -0.415 
 [0.73] [1.68]* [1.69]* 
share of land flat -0.261 -0.607 -0.598 
 [1.29] [2.36]** [2.30]** 
Ln of land (in ha) 0.431 0.41 0.425 
  [3.57]*** [6.35]*** [6.28]*** 
Ln of number of adults 0.113 0.116 0.13 
  [0.92] [0.88] [0.98] 
Ln of funct score weighted adults 0.461 0.425 0.404 
  [3.74]*** [2.76]*** [2.59]*** 
Male head? 1.388 1.203 1.198 
  [1.97]* [2.31]** [2.31]** 
Ln of age head -0.126 -0.196 -0.177 
  [0.92] [1.41] [1.24] 
Ln of average years of education 0.069 0.004 0.006 
  [1.74] [0.13] [0.19] 
Ln of livestock value 0.041 0.04 0.042 
  [2.24]** [2.81]*** [2.83]*** 
Ln of number of links 0.162 0.403 0.425 
  [2.79]** [4.45]*** [3.05]*** 
Asymmetric? (yes=1) 0.14 0.428  
 [1.87]* [2.88]***  
If asymmetric, whether hub?   0.428 
   [1.98]** 
If asymmetric, whether spoke?   0.509 
   [2.56]** 
Observations 472 404 404 
R-squared 0.49   
Diagnostics related to instruments:   
Shea Partial R2 (relevance of instruments) Links: 0.13 Links: 0.14 
Asymmetry: 0.19 Hub: 0.15 
 Spoke: 0.15 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test): Chi-q(44) 53.23 51.17 
 (p-value=0.17) (p-value=0.18) 
 
Robust t statistics in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
The regressions control for fixed effects at the village level (not reported). First stage regressions include 
whether born in the village, the number of blood relatives in the village, years of residence in the village as 
well as a full set of neighbourhood fixed effects. 
 Table 6A: First stage regressions for instrumentation of number of links and architecture 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 
 
First stage 
regression 
(Links) 
T-statistic First stage 
regression 
(Asymmetry) 
T-statistic 
Exogenous variables     
share of land with lem quality -0.249 -1.3 -0.080 -0.79 
share of land with lem teuf quality -0.076 -0.39 -0.072 -0.68 
share land on slope 0.405 1.25 -0.029 -0.16 
share of land flat 0.535 1.69 -0.020 -0.12 
Ln of land (in ha) 0.130 1.62 -0.016 -0.33 
Ln of number of adults 0.195 1.27 0.124 1.65 
Ln of funct score weighted adults -0.080 -0.47 -0.161 -1.84 
Male head? 0.621 1.2 -0.365 -1.31 
Ln of age head 0.155 0.83 0.005 0.05 
 Ln of average years of education 0.000 0 -0.003 -0.3 
Ln of livestock value 0.040 2.63 -0.004 -0.47 
Community fixed effects     
V1 1.332 4.25 -0.491 -1.56 
V2 -1.156 -2.31 0.427 1.24 
V3 -0.484 -0.84 0.514 1.73 
V4 -0.081 -0.15 0.094 0.22 
V5 0.521 0.99 -0.051 -0.1 
V6 0.775 1.92 -0.438 -1.35 
V7 -0.591 -1.79 0.266 0.87 
V8 -0.824 -0.95 0.480 1.68 
V9 0.564 1.88 0.532 1.81 
V10 0.431 1.28 0.159 0.37 
V11 0.155 0.41 0.438 1.35 
     
Instruments     
No. of blood relatives in village 0.069** 1.98 -0.015*** -2.96 
born in village? -0.043 -0.34 -0.041* -1.63 
Years resident for head -0.003* -1.82 0.001 0.31 
Neighbourhood fixed effects  
(65 fixed effects across villages, F-
test of joint significance:) 
p-value=0.00 p-value=0.02 
R-squared 0.13 0.19 
 
Table 6B: First stage regressions for instrumentation of number of links and architecture 
(hubs & spokes) 
 
 
  1 2 3 4   
 
First stage 
regression 
(Links) 
T-statistic First stage 
regression 
(Hubs) 
T-statistic First stage 
regression 
(Spokes) 
T-
statistic 
Exogenous variables       
share of land with lem quality -0.273 -1.450 -0.077 -0.660 -0.163 1.570 
share of land with lem teuf 
quality -0.107 -0.560 -0.010 -0.090 -0.067 -0.630 
share land on slope 0.420 1.280 -0.149 -0.740 0.130 0.710 
share of land flat 0.551 1.700 -0.187 -0.940 0.160 0.880 
Ln of land (in ha) 0.115 1.360 -0.029 -0.550 0.006 0.120 
Ln of number of adults 0.163 1.050 0.024 0.250 0.117 1.330 
Ln of funct score weighted 
adults 0.062 0.290 -0.191 -1.460 0.042 0.350 
Male head? 0.906 1.200 -0.959 -2.070 0.435 1.030 
Ln of age head 0.058 0.260 -0.139 -1.000 0.133 1.050 
 Ln of average years of 
education -0.002 -0.090 0.005 0.320 -0.014 -1.060 
Ln of livestock value 0.040 2.230 -0.015 -1.360 0.009 0.900 
Community fixed effects       
V1 0.042 0.040 -0.081 -0.140 -0.144 -0.270 
V2 0.406 0.620 -0.249 -0.620 0.353 0.960 
V3 1.447 2.660 -0.778 -2.330 -0.083 -0.270 
V4 0.990 1.210 -0.359 -0.710 0.613 1.330 
V5 1.745 2.970 -0.676 -1.870 -0.148 -0.450 
V6 0.839 1.560 -0.099 -0.300 0.214 0.710 
V7 0.625 1.250 -0.203 -0.660 0.200 0.710 
V8 -0.399 -0.390 0.915 1.470 -0.030 -0.050 
V9 0.524 0.730 -0.178 -0.410 0.459 1.140 
V10 0.900 1.490 0.473 1.280 0.020 0.060 
V11 0.577 1.210 -0.053 -0.180 -0.144 -0.270 
Instruments       
No. of blood relatives in village 0.065* 1.800 -0.039* -1.770 0.017 0.860 
born in village? -0.071 -0.550 0.050 0.640 -0.077* -1.760 
Years resident for head -0.003 -1.620 0.002 0.630 -0.001 -0.460 
Neighbourhood fixed effects  
(65 fixed effects across villages, 
F-test of joint significance) 
(p-value=0.00) (p-value=0.01) (p-value=0.01) 
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.14 
 
 
 
 
